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complexities, appeal to emotions over intellect, and fuel 
partisan politics.
Visual rulemaking also implicates significant doctrinal 
questions, including fundamental provisions of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (APA) and prohibitions on agency 
lobbying. While none of these doctrinal issues threaten to 
obstruct visual rulemaking entirely, they do suggest that 
agencies’ use of visuals may need to change some around 
the margins. Ultimately, we conclude that administra-
tive law doctrine and theory can and should welcome the 
arrival of visual rulemaking.
II. The Ad Hoc Emergence of 
Visual Rulemaking
Until recently, visual communication played little role in 
the rulemaking realm, even among e-rulemaking scholars.1 
However, beginning in the Obama Administration, the 
president, Congress, members of the public, and repeat-
player institutions are all using the tools of the modern, 
quintessentially visual, information age to wield influence 
over the regulatory state.
A. Agencies
An evolving group of visually adventurous agencies—
nearly all of which are executive agencies under the con-
trol of the president—is beginning to deploy the power of 
visuals in the context of high-stakes, politically charged 
rulemaking proceedings. These agencies—which currently 
include, among others, the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), Department of Transportation (DOT), Depart-
ment of Labor (DOL), and Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA)—are not monolithic in their use of visuals. 
Nonetheless, their collective visual exploits show that rule-
making is no longer a solely textual endeavor.
1. See, e.g., Michael Herz, Using Social Media in Rulemaking: Possibilities 
and Barriers, Final Report to the Administrative Conference of the Unit-
ed States 24 (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/Herz%20Social%20Media%20Final%20Report.pdf (“[O]ne 
of the defining characteristics of social media is that it is multi-media and 
therefore allows communication other than through words. That is breath-
taking and wonderful and valuable in many settings. But writing regulations 
just is not one of them.”).
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I. Introduction
This Article uncovers an emerging and significant phe-
nomenon that has gathered momentum only within the 
last few years: the use of visual media to develop, critique, 
and engender support for (or opposition to) high-stakes, 
and sometimes virulently controversial, federal rulemak-
ings. Visuals have played little historical role in rulemak-
ing. Instead, the rarified realm of rulemaking has remained 
technocratic in its form—defined by linear analysis, black-
and-white text, and expert reports. Now, due to the explo-
sion of highly visual social media, a visual transformation 
in rulemaking has resulted in what might at first appear to 
be two separate universes: on one hand, the official rule-
making proceedings, which even in the digital age remain 
text-bound, technocratic, and difficult for lay citizens to 
comprehend, and on the other hand, a newly visual—
newly social—universe in which agencies, the president, 
members of Congress, and public stakeholders sell their 
regulatory ideas. But these universes are not in fact dis-
tinct. Visual rulemaking—even when it is outside the four 
corners of official rulemaking proceedings—is seeping into 
the technocracy.
This has significant theoretical implications for admin-
istrative law. We conclude that agencies’ use of visuals to 
market their regulatory agendas—often in direct coor-
dination with President Barack Obama’s sophisticated 
exploitation of digital media—furthers two fundamental 
theoretical justifications underpinning the regulatory state: 
transparency and political accountability. In addition, 
visual tools have the potential to democratize public par-
ticipation and to enable greater dialogue between agencies 
and the public. Despite these theoretical advantages, visual 
rulemaking raises serious risks. Visuals may oversimplify 
This Article is adapted from Elizabeth Porter & Kathryn Watts, 
Visual Rulemaking, 91 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1183 (2016), and is 
reprinted with permission. The authors wish to thank Kaleigh 
Powell, Cynthia Fester, Devon King, and the librarians at the UW 
School of Law for their excellent assistance; and Sanne Knudsen, 
Lisa Manheim, Peter Nicolas, Rafael Pardo, Rebecca Tushnet, 
Todd Wildermuth, David Ziff, and participants in the UW Legal 
Methods Workshop.
Copyright © 2018 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
8-2018 NEWS & ANALYSIS 48 ELR 10699
The most prominent way in which agencies are deploy-
ing visuals in the rulemaking context involves what we 
call the “outflow” of information from agencies. Outflow-
oriented visuals enable agencies to tell—and to sell—their 
rulemaking stories to the American people, and to counter 
narratives offered by any opposing institutional stakehold-
ers. At the forefront of this emerging trend, EPA has lev-
eraged visual media to promote high-profile rulemakings, 
particularly its Clean Power Plan2 and Clean Water Rule.3
From the outset of its Clean Power Plan rulemaking, 
EPA unleashed a torrent of visuals aimed at marketing 
its proposed rule to the public. For instance, just as it 
released its notice of proposed rulemaking,4 EPA posted a 
video titled “Clean Power Plan Explained” to its YouTube 
channel,5 illustrating how the proposed rule will “boost 
our economy, protect our health and environment and 
fight climate change.”6 EPA also used social media to dis-
2. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Sources, 80 Fed. Reg. 64662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 60).
3. See generally Clean Water Rule, U.S. Envt’l Protection Agency (U.S. EPA), 
http://www.epa.gov/cleanwaterrule (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
4. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Sources, 79 Fed. Reg. 34830 (proposed June 18, 
2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 60).
5. See U.S. EPA, Clean Power Explained, YouTube (June 2, 2014), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=AcNTGX_d8mY.
6. Id.
seminate colorful photographs,7 videos,8 and infographics 
about its plan:
When EPA announced in August 2015 that it was final-
izing the Clean Power Plan, a slew of additional visuals 
followed.9 These visuals did not seek participation in the 
rulemaking. Instead, they marketed the benefits of EPA’s 
proposal to the American people.
EPA’s clean water rulemaking (also referred to as the 
“Waters of the U.S.” or “WOTUS” rulemaking) offers a 
second example of visual rulemaking.10 Visuals, ranging 
from videos11 to infographics12 to a social media Thunder-
7. See, e.g., U.S. EPA (@EPA), Twitter (June 10, 2014), https://twitter.com/
EPA/status/476402164169191424 (tweeting the photo of EPA Adminis-
trator talking with reporters about proposed rule).
8. See U.S. EPA (@EPA), Twitter (June 4, 2014), https://twitter.com/EPA/
status/474169813607383041 (tweeting video of EPA Administrator an-
nouncing proposed Clean Power Plan).
9. See, e.g., U.S. EPA (@EPA), Twitter (Jan. 13, 2016), https://twitter.com/
EPA/status/687278131208712192.
10. The WOTUS rulemaking was a joint rulemaking between EPA and the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. See Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 37054 
(June 29, 2015).
11. See, e.g., U.S. EPA, EPA White Board: Clean Water Act Rule Propos-
al Explained, YouTube (Mar. 25, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=fOUESH_JmA0.
12. See, e.g., EPA Water (@EPAwater), Twitter (May 26, 2015), https://
twitter.com/EPAwater/status/603300591113216000; EPA Water (@
EPAwater), Twitter (June 4, 2015), https://twitter.com/EPAwater/
status/606515913077215233.
Source: See EPA (@EPA), Twitter (June 2, 2014), https://
twitter.com/EPA/status/473528421201752064; EPA (@
EPA), Twitter (Sept. 24, 2014), https://twitter.com/EPA/
status/514806567141908481.
EPA Tweets About Proposed 
Clean Power Plan, 2014
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clap campaign,13 represented a highly coordinated effort 
to convince America that #CleanWaterRules, featuring 
everything from a fly fisherman14 to local beer:
Interestingly, many of the visuals that EPA circulated 
during its Clean Water Act rulemaking were responses 
to public feedback on its proposed rule.15 Furthermore, 
when faced with a vehement #DitchTheRule campaign 
unleashed by the American Farm Bureau—an organiza-
tion that advocates on behalf of farmers and ranchers—
EPA fired back with its own #DitchTheMyth campaign, 
using a variety of infographics16 and videos17 to counter the 
Farm Bureau’s narrative.
While this very visual, politically tinged battle was 
being waged over social media, EPA continued collecting 
traditional written comments via Regulations.gov. Thus, 
the comment period during the clean water rulemaking 
played out in parallel universes: one highly textual and 
legalistic in which EPA was silent, and the other a much 
more dialogic and political universe in which EPA had an 
ongoing voice.
13. See infra at notes 75–78 and accompanying text (discussing the EPA’s Thun-
derclap campaign).
14. See EPA Water (@EPAwater), Twitter (Apr. 27, 2015), https://twitter.
com/EPAwater/status/592688337489649665.
15. See, e.g., EPA Water (@EPAwater), Twitter (Aug. 27, 2014), https://twit-
ter.com/EPAwater/status/504640273713205248.
16. See, e.g., EPA Water (@EPAwater), Twitter (Sept. 11, 2014), https://
twitter.com/EPAwater/status/510098078398152704 (#ditchthemyth 
infographic).
17. See, e.g., U.S. EPA, Waters of the U.S.: Ordinary High Water Mark & Tribu-
taries Explained, YouTube (Sept. 26, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=htpiTnAYy-I.
In contrast to their embrace of outflow-oriented visu-
als, agencies have been much less adept at—or perhaps 
interested in—leveraging visuals as a means of inviting 
what we call informational “inflow”—meaning the flow 
of information from the public to agencies in rulemak-
ings. There are exceptions. This tweet from the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)—the only non-exec-
utive agency experimenting with any frequency with visual 
rulemaking—provides one example:
The tweet includes a link that takes viewers directly to 
a CFPB blog post stating: “If you want to influence the 
design of a new prepaid card fee disclosure, let us know 
what you think. Submit a comment at Regulations.gov,” 
followed by the appropriate hyperlink.18 Overall, however, 
agencies have eschewed using visuals in this fashion.
A third and final way in which agencies are using visuals 
is to nudge Congress to take legislative action that would 
advance agencies’ and the president’s political agenda. We 
call this “overflow” because it spills over the edges of specific 
rulemaking proceedings and into the legislative arena.19 
Consider, for example, DOL’s #RaiseTheWage campaign. 
DOL lacks regulatory authority to raise the minimum 
wage for all workers nationwide.20 Consistent with Presi-
dent Obama’s minimum wage campaign,21 however, DOL 
18. Eric Goldberg, Prepaid Products: New Disclosures to Help You Compare Op-
tions, CFPB Blog (Nov. 13, 2014), http://go.usa.gov/srzA.
19. See, e.g., Grow America, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., https://www.transportation.
gov/grow-america (last visited Feb. 25, 2016) (linking to video on DOT’s 
“Grow America” campaign, which pushed for six-year funding bill).
20. Questions and Answers About the Minimum Wage, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/q-a.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2016).
21. See, e.g., The White House, (@whitehouse), Instagram (Aug. 12, 2014), 
https://www.instagram.com/p/rnIEKmQigI/ (infographic asking Congress 
to raise minimum wage to $10.10).
Source: EPA Water (@EPAwater), TWITTER (May 26, 2015), 
https://twitter.com/EPAwater/status/603303236456558592.
EPA #CleanWaterRules Tweet, 2015
Source: CFPB (@CFPB), TWITTER (Nov. 19, 2014), https://twitter.
com/CFPB/status/535123637582708736.
CFPB Tweet, “Let us know what you think,” 2014
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posted an entire page of colorful “shareables” to its website, 
visually advocating for a higher national minimum wage22:
This is one example of how agencies are leveraging 
visual communications even beyond the confines of their 
delegated authority.
B. The President
Like agencies, Obama leveraged visuals to control and 
shape the regulatory state. First, he used visuals to show 
his influence on the initiation and substance of rulemak-
ings and to publicly throw his political capital behind pro-
posed rules. This can be seen in a variety of high-stakes 
22. See Shareables, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, http://www.dol.gov/featured/mini-
mum-wage/infographics (last visited Feb. 25, 2016).
rulemakings, including DOL’s fiduciary duty rule,23 DOL’s 
overtime rule,24 and EPA’s and DOT’s fuel efficiency stan-
dards.25 Perhaps the best example, however, is Obama’s 
effort to tackle student debt.26 In June 2014, Obama signed 
a memorandum directing the Department of Education 
(DOE) to propose student debt regulations.27 Simultane-
ously, the White House issued a steady stream of visual 
communications designed to spread the president’s message 
of regulatory action, including a photo of Obama signing 
the memorandum while flanked by student borrowers,28 
and an Instagram image of a school notebook highlighting 
key points of Obama’s plan29:
23. See Weekly Address: Ensuring Hardworking Americans Retire With Dig-
nity, The White House (Feb. 28, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
the-press-office/2015/02/28/weekly-address-ensuring-hardworking-ameri-
cans-retire-dignity.
24. See The White House, Weekly Address: Rewarding Hard Work by Strengthen-
ing Overtime Pay Protections, YouTube (March 15, 2014), https://youtu.be/
HGqFQxEtX5k?list=UUYxRlFDqcWM4y7FfpiAN3KQ (showing Obama 
explaining that he directed DOL to update its overtime rules).
25. See The White House, Facebook (Feb. 18, 2014), https://www.facebook.
com/WhiteHouse/photos/a.158628314237.115142.63811549237/10152
290509134238/?type=3&theater (infographic explaining how Obama di-
rected formulation of new fuel efficiency standards).
26. See generally Making College Affordable, The White House, https://www.
whitehouse.gov/issues/education/higher-education/making-college-afford-
able (last visited Feb. 25, 2016).
27. See Barack Obama, Student Loan Repayments, The White House (June 9, 
2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/09/presiden-
tial-memorandum-federal-student-loan-repayments (directing the Secretary 
of Education to “propose regulations that will allow” certain students to cap 
their federal student loan payments at 10 percent of their income).
28. See David Hudson, President Obama on Student Loan Debt: “No Hard-
Working Young Person Should Be Priced Out of a Higher Education,” White 
House Blog (June 9, 2014), https://perma.cc/TU2C-EHR6; see also The 
White House, (@whitehouse), Instagram, https://www.instagram.com/p/
pCvCwBQisI/.
29. See The White House, (@whitehouse), Instagram (June 9, 2014), https://
www.instagram.com/p/pCBHrSQisT/?taken-by=whitehouse.
Source: Shareables, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/fea-
tured/minimum-wage/infographics (last visited Feb. 25, 2016).
Shareables From DOL’s 
#RaiseTheWage Campaign
Visuals Accompanying Obama’s Directive 
to DOE Regarding Student Debt, 2014
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The White House also posted a video to its blog and to 
YouTube in which Obama spoke passionately about his per-
sonal student debt experiences.30 These visuals highlighted 
the president’s involvement in prompting DOE to address 
the issue of student debt. Ultimately, DOE listened.31
President Obama also used visuals as a mechanism for 
claiming credit for and asserting ownership over final rules. 
One illustration is in the “memo to America”—a modern 
fireside chat—that Obama issued just one day before EPA 
announced its final version of the Clean Power Plan32:
The video, with a voiceover by Obama, illustrates why 
his “administration” is releasing “[t]he biggest, most impor-
30. See The White House, President Obama Speaks on Student Loan Debt, You-
Tube (June 9, 2014), https://youtu.be/Mz5prW9iw14.
31. See Student Assistance General Provisions, 80 Fed. Reg. 67204 (Oct. 13, 
2015).
32. See Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.
gov/cleanpowerplan/clean-power-plan-existing-power-plants (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2016) (noting that EPA announced its final Clean Power Plan on 
August 3, 2015).
tant step we’ve ever taken to combat climate change.”33 
Notably, the video does not mention that the Clean Power 
Plan was the product of a long and highly technical rule-
making process led by EPA.34
C. Stakeholders Outside of the Executive Branch
Rulemaking stakeholders outside the executive branch—
industry insiders, members of Congress, the media, and 
everyday Americans—also are using visuals to create a 
public dialogue about rulemaking. Members of Con-
gress, for example, frequently disseminate visuals about 
rulemaking,35 sometimes directing constituents to the offi-
cial rulemaking process,36 other times simply encouraging 
a political dialogue on social media.
A tweet from Sen. Ted Cruz, opposing a proposed Inter-
nal Revenue Service (IRS) rule involving tax-exempt social 
welfare organizations, falls into the latter category:
33. The White House, President Obama on America’s Clean Power Plan, You-
Tube (Aug. 2, 2015), https://youtu.be/uYXyYFzP4Lc.
34. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Sources, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64662, 64663 (noting 
the “unprecedented outreach and engagement with states, tribes, utilities, 
and other stakeholders” that led to promulgation of the rule).
35. See, e.g., Senator Pat Toomey, Pushing Back on Out-of-Control EPA Regula-
tions, YouTube (April 9, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8VX-
wiMGUEg (responding to proposed Clean Water Rule).
36. See, e.g., Senator Chuck Grassley, Supporting the Renewable Fuel Standard, 
YouTube (Jan. 16, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_r_oLk5e-
7dI (encouraging Iowans to file comments with EPA on its proposed renew-
able fuel standard).
Source: The White House, (@whitehouse), INSTAGRAM, https://www.insta-
gram.com/p/pCBHrSQisT/?taken-by=whitehouse
Source: The White House, President Obama on America’s 
Clean Power Plan, YOUTUBE (Aug. 2, 2015), https://youtu.be/
uYXyYFzP4Lc
Obama’s Memo to America on 
Clean Power Plan, 2015
Source: Ted Cruz (@tedcruz), TWITTER (Feb. 18, 2014), https://
twitter.com/tedcruz/status/435870573051121664
Tweet From Senator Ted Cruz, 2014
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This tweet was not designed to prompt constituents to 
file official comments during the public comment period, 
which had already closed.37 Rather, it linked to a page that 
expressly requested viewers to “[s]pread the word about this 
proposed rule change with your Facebook friends and Twit-
ter followers.”38
Sometimes, the media uses visuals to put a spotlight on 
proposed regulations and encourage public comments on 
the rules. No better example of this exists than John Oliver’s 
late-night comedy spot on the Federal Communications 
Commission’s (FCC) net neutrality rulemaking, which 
called upon viewers to speak up and gave them the web 
address for the agency’s official commenting platform.39 
This proved tremendously effective, ultimately prompting 
45,000 new comments to flood into FCC’s comment sys-
tem.40 Interest groups have deployed similar tactics.41
At other times, visuals seem designed primarily to drum 
up unofficial political support. Consider again the Ameri-
can Farm Bureau’s #DitchTheRule campaign.42 A center-
piece of the campaign was a video parody set to the musical 
score “Let It Go” from the movie Frozen.43 In the video, 
children pretend to canoe, fish, and swim in dry ditches 
on their farm:
37. See Stop the IRS’s Abuse of Power, Senator Ted Cruz, http://www.cruz.senate.
gov/irs/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2016) (“The public commenting period may 
have ended, but you can still make your voice heard.”).
38. Id.
39. HBO, Last Week Tonight With John Oliver: Net Neutrality (June 1, 2014), 
YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fpbOEoRrHyU, at 11:07.
40. See Ben Brody, How John Oliver Transformed the Net Neutrality Debate 
Once and for All, Bloomberg (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.bloomberg. 
com/politics/articles/2015-02-26/how-john-oliver-transformed-the-net- 
neutrality-debate-once-and-for-all.
41. See, e.g., Healthcare Professionals’ Perspectives: FDA Proposed Rule on Generic 
Drug Labeling, GPHA Online, http://www.gphaonline.org/media/cms/
GPhA5886_infographic_v5_a_.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2016); see also Vic-
tor Villegas, You Need to Comment on the #NPRM, YouTube (March 6, 
2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cyr8oNhNZlo&app=desktop 
(music parody set to tune of famous “YMCA” song designed to encourage 
comments on proposed drone rules).
42. See, e.g., Nebraska Farm Bureau, Waters of the U.S. Rule Explained, YouTube 
(June 30, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SFe9u2696gg&app=
desktop; #DitchTheRule, Farm Bureau, http://wamc.org/post/farmers-
fight-epa-over-proposed-water-rule#stream/0 (last visited Feb. 25, 2016); 
It’s Time to Ditch the Rule, American Farm Bureau, http://ditchtherule.
fb.org/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2016).
43. See Missouri Farm Bureau, That’s Enough—“Let It Go” Parody, YouTube 
(May 23, 2014), https://youtu.be/9U0OqJqNbbs.
The video has more than 140,000 views,44 and the fam-
ily was interviewed by Fox News.45 Thus, the Farm Bureau 
successfully used the video to call public attention to its 
opposition to EPA’s proposed rule.
III. Implications for the 
Future of Rulemaking
As we have demonstrated, rulemaking is no longer a solely 
textual affair. Below, we begin the yet-uncharted inquiry 
into the theoretical and doctrinal implications of this 
emerging phenomenon.
A. Theoretical Implications
One major theoretical justification frequently offered in 
support of allowing Congress to delegate large swaths of 
legislative-like power to agencies involves notions of politi-
cal accountability. Notably, reliance on political account-
ability rests on a big but often unstated assumption: that 
the electorate will indeed know whom to blame—or whom 
to credit—for regulatory action or inaction. However, 
agencies routinely strip the rulemaking record of any ref-
erences to political influences.46 This lack of transparency 
has serious consequences for administrative law’s reliance 
on theories of political control and accountability.47 Visual 
rulemaking enhances political accountability by raising 
the visibility of agencies’ regulatory activities and the presi-
dent’s tight control over executive agencies.
A second—and somewhat conflicting—justification 
frequently offered in support of agency rulemaking turns 
on notions of agency expertise. Administrative law today 
veers between acknowledging the important role that 
politics plays in justifying agency action, and demanding 
that agencies act in a technocratic, expert-driven man-
ner. Not surprisingly, visual rulemaking reflects—indeed, 
heightens—this longstanding, simmering tension, making 
clear what often goes unspoken: there is no perfectly clean 
demarcation between expert-driven decisions and policy-
driven decisions.
For example, the American Farm Bureau’s #Ditchthe-
Rule campaign—and EPA’s corresponding #DitchtheMyth 
campaign—highlights how politics, and not merely sci-
ence, influence regulations. In the competing campaigns, 
the Farm Bureau unleashed a variety of visuals designed 
to establish as “fact” various takes on EPA’s rule that EPA 
44. Id.
45. See WATCH: Frustrated Farmers Parody “Let It Go” to Protest EPA Regulations, 
Fox News Insider (June 9, 2014), http://insider.foxnews.com/2014/06/09/
video-frustrated-farmers-parody-let-it-go-protest-epa-regulations.
46. See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capri-
cious Review, 119 Yale L.J. 2, 23 (2009) (“[A]gencies today generally couch 
their decisions in technocratic, statutory, or scientific language, either fail-
ing to disclose or affirmatively hiding political influences that factor into 
the mix.”).
47. Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Mak-
ing, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 1127, 1159 (2010) (noting that the presidential 
supervision process is largely “opaque”).
Source: See Missouri Farm Bureau, That’s Enough—“Let It Go” 
Parody, YOUTUBE (May 23, 2014), https://youtu.be/9U0OqJqNbbs
#DitchTheRule Video Parody, 2014
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countered by deeming them “myths.”48 For example, see 
this visual battle about the scope of the rule:
48. Compare American Farm Bureau, #DitchTheRule, http://ditchtherule.
fb.org/custom_page/stop-epa-overreach-farm-bureaus-stallman-tells-con-
gress/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2016), with EPA, Ditch the Myth, U.S. EPA, 
Lost in this tussle was the complexity of the rulemak-
ing proceeding, which resulted in a 74-page final rule.49 
Instead, simplified “facts” and “myths” were visually slung 
back and forth in what looked more like a political cam-
paign than a technocratic process.
Thus, when it comes to the expertise rationale for agency 
rulemaking, visual communications present a mixed bag. 
On one hand, visuals threaten to oversimplify, obscure, 
and twist facts; on the other hand, visuals demonstrate that 
even purportedly technocratic rulemakings involve policy 
calls, thereby enhancing transparency in the process.
Finally, a third justification frequently offered in sup-
port of the legitimacy of rulemaking is that agencies must 
allow significant public participation when promulgating 
rules. Visuals may help overcome barriers to public par-
ticipation in the rulemaking process. For example, EPA’s 
video explaining the Clean Power Plan has been viewed 
more than 28,000 times.50 Similarly, Obama’s video mes-
sage to FCC on net neutrality has been viewed nearly one 
million times.51 Visuals circulated by parties outside of the 
executive branch also play a role.
In sum, visual rulemaking has the potential to strengthen 
and further democratize public participation, and advance 
transparency and political accountability in the regulatory 
world. Yet visual rulemaking poses serious risks as well, 
including the risk that visual appeals may turn high-stakes 
rulemakings into viral political battles, undermining the 
expert-driven foundations of the regulatory state.
B. Doctrinal Implications
The use of visuals in the rulemaking realm raises significant 
doctrinal issues in key areas. We discuss two here: (1) the 
APA; and (2) anti-lobbying and anti-propaganda laws.52
1. The APA
Nothing in the APA, enacted in 1946,53 expressly speaks to agen-
cies’ or others’ use of visuals in the rulemaking realm. Nonethe-
less, agencies’ treatment of visuals could run afoul of the APA’s 
notice-and-comment, record, and open mind requirements.
The APA requires that agencies’ notices of proposed 
rulemakings include “a statement of the time, place, and 
nature of public rulemaking proceedings.”54 This notice 
requirement is designed to “afford interested parties a 
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201407/documents/ditch_the_
myth_wotus.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2016).
49. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. 
Reg. at 37054.
50. EPA, Clean Power Explained, YouTube (June 2, 2014), https://www.you-
tube.com/watch?v=AcNTGX_d8mY.
51. See The White House, President Obama’s Statement on Keeping the Inter-
net Free and Open, YouTube (Nov. 10, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=uKcjQPVwfDk
52. The full-length version of this Article also discusses the First Amendment. 
Other legal issues might surface as well, including those concerning copy-
right and ex parte contacts between agencies and stakeholders.
53. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 551-706 (2012)).
54. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)(1), (3).
Source: See #DitchTheRule, http://ditchtherule.fb.org/custom_page/
stop-epa-overreach-farm-bureaus-stallman-tells-congress/
Image of Agricultural Land, 
#DitchTheRule Campaign, 2014
Source: EPA Water (@EPAwater), TWITTER (Sept. 11, 2014), 
https://twitter.com/EPAwater/status/510098078398152704
EPA’s Response, #ditchthemyth, 2014
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reasonable opportunity to participate in the rulemaking 
process.”55 Agencies deploying online visuals seeking feed-
back routinely fail to clarify whether or not that feedback 
will be considered an official “comment,” thus triggering 
agencies’ obligation to consider and to respond to all sig-
nificant comments received.56 To the extent this ambiguity 
prevents the public from understanding the proper channel 
for participating in the rulemaking process, it undermines 
the central purpose of the APA’s notice requirement.57
For example, consider this 2015 Facebook post by FDA:
Text accompanying the graphic question does contain 
a link to an FDA webpage, which prominently and clearly 
notifies interested stakeholders how and where they can file 
official comments.58 Nonetheless, because Facebook allows 
users to “comment,” viewers might reasonably conclude 
that they could participate in FDA’s proceeding simply by 
commenting on Facebook.
Whether an agency will only consider feedback filed on 
Regulations.gov as official comments, or includes feedback 
solicited in social media as part of the official rulemaking 
record, it should clearly notify public stakeholders.59 Ulti-
mately, we believe the latter approach is required. When 
justifying a final rule, an agency may not rely upon mate-
rials that are not in the rulemaking record.60 Thus, the 
55. Friends of Iwo Jima v. Nat’l Capital Planning Comm’n, 176 F.3d 768, 774 
(4th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he purpose of providing notice” is “soliciting com-
ments and fostering debate.”).
56. See, e.g., Reyblatt v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 105 F.3d 715, 722 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997) (“An agency need not address every comment, but it must re-
spond in a reasoned manner to those that raise significant problems.”).
57. Cf. Herz, supra note 1, at 75 (“If a layperson would be reasonably misled 
into thinking that the social media discussion was an official forum for com-
menting, then a strong argument could be made that the agency is interfer-
ing with or denying the opportunity to comment.”).
58. “Natural” on Food Labeling, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., http://www.fda.
gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInforma-
tion/LabelingNutrition/ucm456090.htm (updated Dec. 24, 2015).
59. Cf. Recommendation 2011-8, Agency Innovations in e-Rulemaking, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 2257, 2265 (Jan. 17, 2012) (asserting that agencies should “provide 
clear notice as to whether and how it will use [a social media] discussion in 
the rulemaking proceeding).
60. See Herz, supra note 1, at 73 (“Material that is not put into the rulemaking 
docket . . . cannot be relied on to justify the final rule.”).
artificial separation that agencies are currently trying to 
maintain between the “unofficial” visual rulemaking world 
and the “official” textual, legalistic rulemaking world will 
necessarily break down if agencies try to justify their final 
rules by relying upon communications the agency received 
in the visual, online world.
More broadly, agencies’ use of visuals to campaign for 
proposed rules could also call into question the legiti-
macy of agencies’ consideration of public comments. The 
APA’s comment requirement rests on the assumption that 
agencies will “maintain minds open to whatever insights 
the comments produced by notice under §  553 may 
generate.”61 Thus, agencies should ensure that their visu-
als do not turn into what appear to be uncompromising 
advocacy campaigns.62
Visual rulemaking also raises questions relating to the 
APA’s record requirement.63 For judicial review, the admin-
istrative record must contain materials that are directly or 
indirectly considered by the agency, not just those materi-
als that the agency actually relied upon.64 An agency may 
not, for example, “skew the record by excluding unfavor-
able information” that was before it at the time the decision 
was made.65 Notably, however, courts grant agencies “a pre-
sumption that [they] properly designated the administrative 
record absent clear evidence to the contrary.”66 An agency’s 
failure to include its videos in the administrative record—or 
an agency’s omission of textual feedback submitted by the 
public in response to an agency communication—might 
lead to disputes over the sufficiency of the record.
2. Anti-Lobbying and 
Anti-Propaganda Statutes
For nearly as long as agencies have existed, Congress has 
been uncomfortable with agencies’ power.67 Perhaps most 
troubling, from Congress’s perspective, is when agencies 
use federal funds—funds granted to them by Congress—
to turn back and lobby Congress.68 Thus, for over a century, 
Congress has passed statutes that attempt to circumscribe 
agency communications in two ways.
The first includes anti-publicity and anti-propaganda 
provisions in annual appropriations bills aimed at limit-
ing agencies’ messaging to the American public.69 The 
61. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
62. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3, 23, 28, Am. 
Farm Bureau v. EPA, No. 3:15-cv-00165 (S.D. Tex. July 2, 2015).
63. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
64. See, e.g., Tafas v. Dudas, 530 F. Supp. 2d 786, 793-94 (E.D. Va. 2008) 
(“[A]n agency may not exclude information on the ground that it did not 
‘rely’ on that information in its final decision.”).
65. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 118 F. Supp. 3d 244 (D.D.C. 
2015).
66. Lee Memorial Hosp. v. Burwell, 109 F. Supp. 3d 40, 47 (D.D.C. 2015).
67. See generally Mordecai Lee, Congress vs. The Bureaucracy: Muzzling 
Agency Public Relations (2011).
68. See William V. Luneburg, The Lobbying Manual 338 (Thomas M. Sus-
man and Rebecca H. Gordon, Eds., 4th ed. 2009) (“Congress does not want 
to fund anyone who tries to influence its actions.”). 
69. Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2015, 
Pub. L. No. 113-235, div. E, Section 718.
Source: U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FACEBOOK (Nov. 10, 2015), 
https://www.facebook.com/FDA/photos/a.411715387298.184452.
94399502298/10153709622187299/?type=3&theater
FDA’s Visual Announcement Inviting 
Comments on Use of Term “Natural,” 2015
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second targets lobbying of Congress by agencies, particu-
larly “grassroots lobbying,” which occurs when agencies 
encourage the public to contact legislators to support or 
oppose a congressional measure.70 In general, the laws in 
both categories have been woefully ineffective. The Gov-
ernment Accountability Office (GAO), left with the task 
of interpreting these provisions,71 has chiseled away at the 
laws’ broad wording, leaving little agency conduct within 
their ambit. Nevertheless, congressional outrage over EPA’s 
use of visual media in its clean water rulemaking appears to 
have breathed some new life into these laws.
For example, in 2015, GAO found that EPA violated the 
propaganda ban by disseminating “covert propaganda”72 
during its #CleanWaterRules campaign. GAO has inter-
preted the prohibition on “covert propaganda” as essen-
tially a disclosure requirement.73 As part of its campaign, 
EPA used Thunderclap—a social media platform designed 
to create an “online flash mob.”74 EPA created a Thunder-
clap page titled “I Choose Clean Water” and used social 
media to sign up supporters:
70. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., Principles of Federal Appropria-
tions Law, 4 GAO-RB pt. C s. 11 at 1, 2004 WL 5661385 (2015).
71. See Luneburg, supra note 68, at 340 (GAO has authority “to investigate all 
matters relating to the use of appropriated funds”).
72. See, e.g., Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 
2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, div. E, Section 718 (barring use of appropria-
tions for “propaganda”).
73. See Letter From Susan A. Poling, General Counsel, Gov’t Accountability 
Off., to James M. Inhofe, Chairman, Comm. on Env’t & Pub. Works (Dec. 
14, 2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/674163.pdf.
74. See Frequently Asked Questions, Thunderclap, https://www.thunderclap.it/
faq (last visited Feb. 20, 2016).
At 2 p.m. on September 29, 2014, the social media sites of 
every registered supporter stated: “Clean water is important 
to me. I support EPA’s efforts to protect it for my health, 
my family, and my community.”75 The message, which 
contained a hyperlink connected to EPA’s web page on the 
Clean Water Rule,76 reached over 1.8 million people.77
GAO found that this campaign constituted “covert pro-
paganda” because, while original supporters were aware of 
EPA’s sponsorship, the Thunderclap message itself did not 
identify EPA; rather, it appeared have been written by the 
person on whose social media site it appeared.78
GAO also found that EPA violated the prohibition on 
grassroots lobbying.79 GAO’s finding focused on an EPA 
blog post, Tell Us Why #CleanWaterRules,80 which contained 
embedded hyperlinks to organizations supporting the Clean 
Water Rule. One such organization’s website contained a 
button that said, “Tell Congress to stop interfering with 
your right to clean water!”81 Notwithstanding EPA’s inabil-
ity to control external websites, GAO found that EPA had 
responsibility for its own message, including hyperlinks.82
GAO’s 2015 report indicates that in a hostile political 
environment, these provisions may be used against adven-
turous agencies. On balance, however, the rise of visual 
media is likely to weaken rather than strengthen anti-pub-
licity and anti-lobbying laws. There is an ever-increasing 
quantity of agency communications—far too much for 
GAO or Congress to monitor. Moreover, post hoc findings 
of violation may have only a limited effect. For example, by 
the time GAO issued its decision, EPA’s Thunderclap mes-
sage was #cleanwater under the bridge.
IV. Conclusion
Visual rulemaking is a new and dynamic phenomenon. Visuals 
shed technicolor light on what has always been true but often hid-
den from plain sight: There is no hermetic seal between the tech-
nocratic and the political, between science and values, between fact 
and spin. Even more importantly, visual rulemaking promises to 
raise public awareness of rulemakings and to empower participation 
by more diverse stakeholders. In light of these benefits, we believe 
that administrative law doctrine and theory should welcome, rather 
than simply ignore, this growing and influential phenomenon.
75. See Poling, supra note 73, at 4.
76. Id. (noting that hyperlink has since been disabled).
77. See U.S. EPA, I Choose Clean Water, Thunderclap, https://www.thunder-
clap.it/projects/16052-i-choose-clean-water (last visited Feb. 20, 2016).
78. See Poling, supra note 73, at 13. Notably, GAO found no “covert propa-
ganda” in the agency’s extensive #DitchTheMyth campaign, because “the 
graphics used in the #DitchTheMyth campaign contained the EPA logo, 
and the prewritten tweets contained the ‘#DitchTheMyth/@EPA water’ as-
cription at the end.” See id. at 15.
79. Id. at 17-20.
80. Travis Loop, Tell Us Why #CleanWaterRules, The EPA Blog (Apr. 7, 2015), 
https://blog.epa.gov/blog/?s=tell+us+why+%23cleanwaterrules.
81. See Poling, supra note 73, at 8.
82. Id. at 23-24.
Source: U.S. EPA, EPA Water Is Worth It, FACEBOOK (Sept. 13, 
2014), https://www.facebook.com/EPAWaterIsWorthIt/
posts/10152446114118337.
EPA “I Choose Clean Water” Facebook Post, 2014
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